California State University, San Bernardino

CSUSB ScholarWorks
Electronic Theses, Projects, and Dissertations

Office of Graduate Studies

6-2014

The Role of Working Memory Resources in Mind Wandering: The
Difference Between Working Memory Capacity and Working
Memory Load
Jason Seiichi Tsukahara
California State University - San Bernardino

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd
Part of the Cognitive Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Tsukahara, Jason Seiichi, "The Role of Working Memory Resources in Mind Wandering: The Difference
Between Working Memory Capacity and Working Memory Load" (2014). Electronic Theses, Projects, and
Dissertations. 81.
https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd/81

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Office of Graduate Studies at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses, Projects, and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of
CSUSB ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@csusb.edu.

i

THE ROLE OF WORKING MEMORY RESOURCES IN MIND WANDERING:
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY AND
WORKING MEMORY LOAD

A Thesis
Presented to the
Faculty of
California State University,
San Bernardino

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
in
Psychology: General Experimental

by
Jason Seiichi Tsukahara
June 2014

ii

THE ROLE OF WORKING MEMORY RESOURCES IN MIND WANDERING:
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY AND
WORKING MEMORY LOAD

A Thesis
Presented to the
Faculty of
California State University,
San Bernardino

by
Jason Seiichi Tsukahara
June 2014
Approved by:

Hideya Koshino, Committee Chair, Psychology
Robert Ricco, Committee Member
John Clapper, Committee Member

iii

© 2014 Jason Seiichi Tsukahara

iv

ABSTRACT
There is no consensus on the relationship between working memory
resources and mind wandering. The purpose of the current study is to investigate
whether mind wandering requires working memory resources to be sustained.
The resource-demanding view is that mind wandering requires working memory
resources to sustain an internal train of thought (Smallwood, 2010). The
resource-free view is that mind wandering is a result of executive control failures
and this internal train of thought proceeds in a resource-free manner (McVay &
Kane, 2010). Participants were presented with thought probes while they
performed a Simon task in single and dual task conditions. From the resourcedemanding view, individuals with high WMC should experience more Task
unrelated thought (TUT) in single and dual task conditions compared to those
with low WMC. From the resource-free view, individuals with high WMC should
experience fewer TUT compared to low WMC individuals. Results indicated that,
WML eliminated the Simon effect for high WMC and reduced it for low WMC
group. Mind wandering was decreased in dual task conditions however there was
no effect of working memory capacity on mind wandering. Also, mind wandering
correlated with task performance measures for the low WMC but not high WMC
group. The results of the current study do not provide strong support for either a
resource-demanding or resource-free view and are discussed in terms of a
context dependent relationship between WMC and mind wandering
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

The experience of having one’s mind drift from a task into daydreaming,
rumination, or planning is a common experience most are familiar with, and can
be referred to as mind wandering. It is interesting that this phenomenon of mind
wandering has only recently made it into mainstream psychology research, given
its ubiquitous nature. 96% of adult Americans report daydreaming of some kind
every day (Singer & McCraven, 1961). Additionally, as many as 30% of thoughts
that people experience in a day can be classified as mind wandering (Kane et al.,
2007). The prevalence of mind wandering may be an under-recognized influence
on human behavior and performance in a variety of areas, such as education
(Smallwood, Fishman, & Schooler, 2007). Furthermore, research investigating
the nature of mind wandering is and may continue to reveal important cognitive
functions of the human mind. There are two things that must be considered
before discussing the empirical research on mind wandering; 1) the terms used
to characterize mind wandering and 2) the various methods developed to
measure mind wandering.

Defining Mind Wandering
While research in psychology has viewed human thought as a goaldirected phenomenon, recent interest in mind wandering and the default mode
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network (e.g., Christoff, 2012) has begun to consider the undirected and
spontaneous nature of thought. Since this research is in its early stages, there is
still uncertainty as to the terminology that should be used to classify various
forms of undirected spontaneous thought. Christoff (2012) defines undirected
thought as “not deliberately directed” by the thinker yet it may be implicitly biased
by the individuals current concerns or emotional state. The important distinction
between undirected and directed thought is that undirected thought does not
proceed by conscious effort towards a particular outcome, characteristic of goaldirected thought. Spontaneous thought is defined as unintended thoughts that
come to mind unbidden and effortlessly (Christoff, 2012). This can occur in
several forms such as daydreaming or mind wandering, although the distinction
between different forms of spontaneous thought is not yet clear. Nevertheless,
the most recent research prefers the term mind wandering, operationally defined
as task-unrelated thought (TUT) (Christoff, 2012). While the term stimulusindependent thought (SIT) is often used in place of mind wandering, especially in
the cognitive neuroscience literature, a distinction between SIT and mind
wandering should be made (Christoff, 2012). TUT is simply defined as any
thought that is not related to a current task, and is contrasted with task-related
thought. SIT is defined as thought that is decoupled from current sensory
information. SIT is contrasted with stimulus-oriented thought, which is thought
directed towards the external sensory environment. TUT can be directed
internally, as SIT, to the current concerns of the individual; or externally, as

2

stimulus-oriented thought, toward stimuli in the environment not related to the
task (e.g. footsteps from the floor above). While SIT may be unrelated to a
current task, it can also be related to the task but not current perceptual stimuli,
such as during memory recall tasks. Therefore, TUT and SIT should be
considered as two independent dimensions of mind wandering. Whatever the
content of TUT, be it stimulus-independent or stimulus-oriented, the experience
of having ones mind drift away from a current task and towards unrelated
concerns is typically referred to as mind wandering (Christoff, 2012).

Measuring Mind Wandering
Methods for directly measuring in-the-moment mind wandering can be
classified into two categories, probe-caught and self-caught methods (Smallwood
& Schooler, 2006). In the probe-caught method, individuals are interrupted
(probed) during a task and are asked what they were thinking about, at the
moment the probe occurred. How the individual is asked to respond can vary
depending on what the researchers are investigating. In the experimenterclassified probe method, participants are asked to report the content of their
thoughts, either verbally or written, and the experimenters can later code these
reports into task-unrelated and task-related thought (Smallwood, Obonsawin, &
Reid, 2003). An alternative to this is the self-classification probe method, in which
participants classify their own subjective experience into a set of given response
options (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). There are typically at least two response
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options such as task-related or task-unrelated thought, but again this can vary
depending on the nature of the experiment. In the self-caught method, individuals
are asked to monitor their awareness for mind wandering thoughts, and report
when they experience TUT. Since this method is confounded with awareness of
mind wandering, the probe-caught method is a better measure of the overall
frequency of mind wandering. Nevertheless, as Smallwood and Schooler (2006)
point out, the use of both self-caught and probe-caught methods may be useful
for distinguishing between mind wandering with and without awareness. Another
method that is used to directly measure mind wandering is the use of
retrospective reports where participants, after completing a task, fill out a
questionnaire to measure their subjective experience during the task
(Smallwood, Riby, Heim, & Davies, 2006).
Numerous studies have found reliability among these different self-report
measures of mind wandering (Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 2004; Smallwood,
Baracaia, Lowe, & Obonsawin, 2003; Smallwood, O’Connor, Sudberry, Haskell,
& Ballantyne, 2004; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Behavioral and physiological
indices of mind wandering on the sustained attention to response task (SART)
have also been investigated (fMRI activity: Christoff, 2012; Mason et al., 2007,
EEG activity: Smallwood, Beach, Schooler, & Handy, 2008, Response times:
Smallwood, McSpadden, Luus, & Schooler, 2008; Smallwood, Davies, et al.,
2004, pupil diameter: Smallwood et al., 2011; Galvanic skin response and heart
rate: Smallwood et al., 2003).
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The (SART) is a common task used to investigate the nature of mind
wandering (Smallwood, Davies, et al., 2004). During this task, participants are to
make a response to frequent non-target stimuli (go trials) and withhold their
response to infrequent target stimuli (no-go trials). This creates a prepotency to
make a response on all trials since no-go trials are infrequent (e.g. 11% of trials).
Failure to withhold a pre-potent response on no-go trials is referred to as action
slips and thought to result from attentional lapses (Robertson, Manly, Andrade,
Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997). An attentional lapse implies that attention has shifted
away from task-relevant information to task-irrelevant information, leading to
more automatic pre-potent responding. Similar experiences can be found in daily
life such as automatically driving on the typical route home from work instead of
stopping at the supermarket to pick up dinner. The similarity this laboratory task
shares with everyday occurrences of attentional lapse is one reason the SART
has been used in research on mind wandering. The interruption of mind
wandering thoughts can be seen as an example of an attentional lapse where
one’s attention has shifted away from a current task and towards internal trains of
thought. Additionally, certain response behaviors on the SART have been
associated with the occurrence of mind wandering that is also characteristic of
attentional lapses, such as accelerated reaction times (Smallwood, Davies, et al.,
2004).
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Models of Mind Wandering
Studies have revealed that mind wandering may have an unrecognized
influence on our behavior. For instance, mind wandering while reading impairs
comprehension of the text, which may have important implications in education
(Smallwood, Fishman, et al., 2007). Unsworth and McMillan (2012) found that
motivation and topic interest influence mind wandering while reading, and these
factors influence scores on reading comprehension tests. The occurrence of
mind wandering even impacts an individual’s score on measures of WMC and
general fluid intelligence (Mrazek et al., 2012). Also, the negative impact
stereotype threat has on cognitive performance may partly be mediated by an
increase in mind wandering (Mrazek et al., 2011). Since researchers have been
interested in the detrimental effects mind wandering may have on task
performance, models of mind wandering attempt to explain what causes it to
occur and why it leads to poor task performance (Smallwood, 2013). Four main
models of mind wandering that explain either what causes it to occur or the
processes involved in its maintenance are discussed as follows (Smallwood,
2013).
Perceptual Decoupling Model
The perceptual decoupling model seeks to address the processes
involved in maintenance of mind wandering, and not necessarily what factors
lead to its occurrence. This model explains performance decline as reflecting
domain-general resource competition between external task events and internal

6

trains of thought (Smallwood, 2013). As mind wandering ensues, attention is
decoupled from external events and directed towards internal thoughts and
feelings. Initial evidence for this came from studies showing reduced mind
wandering as task demands increased. For instance, faster stimulus presentation
rates and increased memory load, decrease frequency of stimulus-independent
thought (SIT) (Teasdale, Proctor, Lloyd, & Baddeley, 1993). Therefore as task
demands increase, resources are deployed to processing external events rather
than internal trains of thought.
As a result of this decoupling, processing of external events is going to be
degraded during mind wandering compared to when attention is focused on the
task (Smallwood, O’Connor, Sudbery, & Obonsawin, 2007). A number of studies
have shown decreased task performance during mind wandering episodes. For
instance, it has been shown that during periods of SIT, participants perform
worse by making more stereotypic responses on a random number generation
task (Teasdale et al., 1995). Smallwood, McSpadden, and Schooler (2008) found
that zoning out (mind wandering without awareness) while reading reduced text
comprehension. More direct evidence for decreased processing of external
events during mind wandering comes from studies looking at pupil diameter (PD)
and EEG cortical activity. Smallwood et al. (2011) examined PD activity during
periods indicative of online (external task processing) and offline (internally
generated thought processing) thought. In a choice reaction time task, during
online thought PD activity changed in response to processing external task
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stimuli whereas during offline thought PD activity was decoupled from task
events. In addition Smallwood, Beach, et al. (2008), using the SART, found a
reduction in the amplitude of the P300 (an index of attention directed toward
stimulus processing) for non-targets during TUT compared to during on-task
thoughts. The assumption of the perceptual decoupling model is that domaingeneral resources are shared between both external and self-generated trains of
thought. For example, in the same way as working memory resources are
involved in the control of external task information, working memory resources
are also required for the continuity of self-generated thought (Smallwood, 2013).
From this perspective, working memory resources do not directly control the
occurrence of mind wandering, but once attention shifts to internally generated
thought, executive processes act to ensure its continuity by preventing
interruption from external stimulation.
Current Concerns
The perceptual decoupling model explains the processes involved in mind
wandering but there is still the question of “what factors lead to the occurrence of
mind wandering in the first place?” Recall that mind wandering was defined as
undirected thought that is “not deliberately directed” by the thinker yet may be
directed by the thinkers current concerns. According to Klinger's (2009) current
concerns theory, daydreaming and mind wandering occur when there is a
discrepancy between a current state and unresolved goal. Watkins' (2008)
control theory approach states that all behavior, including repetitive thought, is a
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process of feedback control where one’s current state is compared with a
reference value such as an unresolved goal. If there is a discrepancy between
the current state and an unresolved goal, then the behavior will be adjusted to
bring it closer to the goal state. Internally generated thought focused on resolving
a discrepancy will persist, and may result in mind wandering, until either the goal
is attained or it is abandoned. Klinger (2009) indicates that the persistence of
current concerns is continuous and automatic, “Thus, having a goal entails a
covert mental process that persists over the life of the goal pursuit.” (Klinger,
2009, p. 229). Additionally one’s current concerns may be automatically triggered
by salient cues either in the environment or by other internal processes such as
memories and will form the content of mind wandering thoughts.
Meta-awareness
Another characteristic of mind wandering is that the experience is often
accompanied with a lack of awareness of its occurring, in which one may
suddenly catch oneself in such a state without having realized it. Schooler et al.
(2004) used both self-caught (awareness of mind wandering) and probe-caught
(not aware of mind wandering) methods to measure mind wandering during text
reading, and found that mind wandering often occurred without awareness. Using
thought probe methods in addition to assessing awareness of one’s immediately
prior experience, Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, and Schooler (2009)
found that performance on the SART was impaired more during mind wandering
without awareness compared to with awareness. Schooler (2002) explains this
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meta-awareness (meta-consciousness) model of mind wandering from a
framework of the relationship between meta-awareness and basic conscious
experience. While conscious processes continuously occur and are monitored
largely by non-conscious processes, meta-awareness is only intermittent. Metaawareness is a re-representation of the contents of conscious experience, in
which one can report or interpret one’s state of mind. For example, while reading
a text, attention may become decoupled and directed towards an internal train of
thought. This decoupled attention may not be corrected until meta-awareness
detects the discrepancy between the intended goal (reading a text) and the
content of experience (mind wandering) (Schooler et al., 2011). Therefore, the
absence of meta-awareness may explain the occurrence of some mind
wandering episodes in addition to moderating the detrimental effects of mind
wandering on performance.
Control Failure
McVay and Kane (2010) proposed a Control Failure x Concerns model of
mind wandering. According to this model, one’s current concerns may
automatically activate task-unrelated thoughts and then, failure to maintain
attention on a current task is what will lead to mind wandering. From this
perspective, greater control of executive attention allows one to maintain task
goals and avoid attention drifting away from the task towards task-unrelated
thoughts. For instance, under conditions of reduced executive control, such as
fatigue and alcohol inebriation, rates of TUT increased (McVay & Kane, 2009;
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Sayette, Reichle, & Schooler, 2009; Smallwood, Davies, et al., 2004). The
control-failure model claims that, while mind wandering occurs because of
executive control failures, it does not require working memory resources to be
sustained. Evidence for this comes from McVay and Kane (2009), in which they
found that TUT decreased as executive attention abilities (working memory
capacity) increased.
Default Mode Network
Interest in the phenomena of mind wandering also comes from the
cognitive neuroscience literature trying to understand the role of a network of
brain regions, now referred to as the default-mode network (DMN). The DMN
includes areas in the medial parietal cortex (posterior cingulate and precuneus),
posterior lateral cortex (Parietal lobe: BA 40 and 39; temporal lobe: BA 22),
medial prefrontal cortex (BA 6, 8, 9 and 10) (Gusnard & Raichle, 2001). This
network of brain regions was shown to be functionally active at rest (a passive
state when not engaged with a task) and decreased activation during task
engagement (Gusnard & Raichle, 2001). Because of this pattern of activation the
DMN has been implicated in activities such as mind wandering that are likely to
occur during periods of non-task engagement. In fact, activity in the DMN has
been shown to be associated with stimulus-independent thought and the
occurrence of mind wandering (Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler,
2009; Christoff, 2012; Mason et al., 2007). Consistent with this evidence current
concerns theory posits daydreaming and mind wandering as a mental default
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state arising from activity in the DMN (Klinger, 2009). Furthermore, as executive
network regions (such as the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, and dorsal lateral
prefrontal cortex) show increased activation, the DMN shows decreased
activation during task engagement. Even in the absence of an ongoing task
these two network regions have been shown to be anti-correlated (Fox et al.,
2005). Koshino et al. (2011) found medial prefrontal cortex (DMN region)
activation during task preparation and deactivation during task execution, within a
single trial. These results suggest that activation and deactivation of default
mode and executive network regions are influenced by the allocation of
attentional resources due to task demands.

The Relation Between Working Memory and Mind Wandering
Smallwood (2013) integrates the perceptual decoupling, current concerns,
meta-awareness and control failure models into a Process-Occurrence
framework of mind wandering and discusses how these models explain different,
though not competing, mechanisms for the occurrence and processes underlying
mind wandering. The current concerns, meta-awareness, and control failure
models explain what may lead to the occurrence of a mind-wandering episode,
while the perceptual decoupling model explains the processes involved once
mind wandering has ensued. Nonetheless, the decoupling and control failure
models explain a different relationship between working memory resources and
mind wandering. The decoupling model claims that working memory resources
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support the continuity of internal trains of thought; this hypothesis will be referred
to as the resource-demanding view. On the other hand, the control failure model
claims that internal trains of thought are automatically cued by current concerns,
sustained in a resource-free manner and that mind wandering is a result of
executive control failure; this will be referred to as the resource-free view.
In order to understand these two competing perspectives on mind
wandering, the concept of working memory resources and its relation to mind
wandering needs to be discussed. While several models of working memory
have been proposed, it is widely considered to represent a mental workspace
and consist of at least two resource limited systems; temporary memory stores
(i.e. phonological loop and visuo-spatial sketchpad: ) and the central executive
(Baddeley, 2000). The central executive system is responsible for coordinating
what information can gain access to limited-capacity memory stores as well as
the maintenance and manipulation of items in working memory. In this way, the
central executive system controls the allocation of attentional focus, such as
when switching attention from one task to another, maintaining information in
memory while performing an independent task or inhibition of processing
distracting information and selection of task relevant information.
Working Memory
The concept of working memory capacity (WMC) is not well defined. One
view refers to WMC more generally as the amount of working memory resources
available for both temporary memory storage and executive processes
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(Baddeley, 2010; Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004). As more working
memory resources are allocated towards maintenance of information held in
working memory, fewer resources are available for executive processes. This
resource view of working memory capacity has been investigated on a wide
variety of distractor interference tasks. By loading working memory with items to
be maintained in memory while performing a concurrent task, the ability for
executive processes to reduce distractor interference is diminished (for a review;
de Fockert, 2013). Also consistent with this view is that individuals with higher
WMC have a greater amount of working memory resources at their disposal
compared to those with lower WMC (Unsworth & Spillers, 2010). Generally, tasks
that measure individual differences in working memory capacity are dual tasks
requiring the participant to hold information in memory while performing an
attention demanding task, such as complex-span tasks (Redick et al., 2012).
Individuals with more working memory resources should therefore score higher
on complex-span tasks than individuals with fewer working memory resources.
An alternative view of WMC is that it mainly reflects control of executive
attention. Individual differences in WMC are thought to mainly reflect differences
in the ability to control attention, especially in contexts of competing demands,
such as dual task situations. For instance, individuals with high WMC, compared
to those with low WMC, are better able to inhibit irrelevant distractor information
(Heitz & Engle, 2007; Shipstead, Harrison, & Engle, 2012), maintain task goals
(Kane & Engle, 2003), and allocate visual attention (Bleckley, Durso, Crutchfield,
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Engle, & Khanna, 2003). WMC is also correlated with general fluid intelligence
and performance on a number of cognitive tasks (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, &
Conway, 1999; Engle, 2002; Kane, Hambrick, & Conway, 2005). Because of the
correlation of WMC with attentional control and higher order cognitive tasks,
working memory is believed to represent a more general cognitive system
reflecting control of executive attention (Engle, 2002).
Working Memory Capacity and Mind Wandering
The nature of the association between WMC and mind wandering differs
between the resource-demanding and resource-free views of mind wandering.
The hypothesis that mind wandering is resource demanding considers WMC as
the availability of domain-general resources and shares similarities with
Baddeley's (2000) model of working memory. For example, Smallwood (2010)
argues that domain-general resources support the continuity of internal trains of
thought in a multimodal workspace. Therefore, higher WMC (more domaingeneral resources) should be associated with more mind wandering, from the
resource demanding view.
In fact, Levinson, Smallwood, and Davidson (2012) did find that as WMC
increases so does mind wandering in low-demanding tasks, such as low
perceptual load conditions. To further understand the role of working memory
resources in mind wandering, Smallwood, Nind, and O’Connor (2009)
investigated the proportion of future and past-oriented thoughts in a choice
reaction time (CRT) task, with a working memory load manipulation. They argue
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that future-oriented mind wandering requires more working memory resources
because it requires planning or creating a potential scenario, whereas pastoriented mind wandering simply requires recollecting past experiences. To
determine this, TUT was further classified into past, present or future-oriented
while performing no working memory load and working memory load tasks. In the
no working memory load, task participants responded to rare target numbers and
responded as to whether the number was even or odd. In the working memory
load condition on rare target numbers, they had to decide if the previous number
was even or odd. They found that future-oriented mind wandering decreased
under working memory load, whereas past-oriented mind wandering was not
affected, suggesting that future-oriented mind wandering requires working
memory resources. Furthermore, in a non-demanding CRT task, WMC was
positively associated with future-oriented mind wandering, and negatively
associated with past-oriented mind wandering, though not correlated with overall
reports of mind wandering (Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011). Therefore,
these results are consistent with a resource-demanding view of mind wandering;
where future-oriented mind wandering is reduced, as fewer working memory
resources are available, due to either increased working memory load or lower
WMC.
Alternatively, the hypothesis that mind wandering occurs in a resourcefree manner considers WMC as reflecting control of executive attention. From
this perspective, mind wandering is a result of failures of goal maintenance.
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Higher WMC represents more control of executive attention, and therefore less
mind wandering (McVay & Kane, 2010). McVay and Kane (2009) investigated
the association between WMC, mind wandering and performance on a SART
task. As WMC increased, TUT decreased, and higher WMC and fewer TUTs
predicted better SART performance (McVay & Kane, 2009). Furthermore,
individual differences in WMC also predict propensity to mind wander outside the
laboratory and in daily life. Kane et al. (2007) gave participants Personal Digital
Assistants (PDAs), and the PDA would signal them to report whether their
thoughts had wandered from whatever they were doing at that time, randomly
throughout their day for seven days. They found that higher WMC was also
associated with less mind wandering in daily life.
Contrary to studies finding that higher WMC is associated with more mind
wandering during non-demanding tasks (Levinson et al., 2012), and specifically
for future-oriented mind wandering (Baird et al., 2011), McVay and Kane (2012)
failed to find a correlation between WMC and mind wandering during a nondemanding task. Challenging the findings, from Baird et al., (2011), that higher
WMC is associated with more future-oriented mind wandering; McVay, Unsworth,
McMillan, and Kane (2013) report results from two independent studies, using a
much larger sample size and broader off-task thought classification. They found
a lack of correlation between WMC and future-oriented or past-oriented mind
wandering while performing the standard SART and a reading task. Therefore,
these null results support a resource-free view of mind wandering.
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It should be recognized that mind wandering occurring as a result of
control-failures is not entirely inconsistent with a resource-demanding view.
Where the resource-demanding and resource-free views differ is on the role of
executive processes involved in maintaining mind wandering. Smallwood (2010)
has proposed that while mind wandering may occur as a result of executive
control-failures, once it has started executive processes act to ensure it’s
continuity. Furthermore, he has suggested that there may be a context
dependent relationship between WMC and mind wandering. Under nondemanding contexts, the need for executive control is low and one’s current
concerns may easily gain access to domain-general processes. In this case, the
context is conducive to mind wandering and executive control processes act to
ensure the continuity of internal trains of thought. Therefore, higher WMC
individuals will show more mind wandering in non-demanding task contexts.
However, in demanding task contexts, the need for executive control is high and
executive control processes must act to maintain attention on the task and away
from mind wandering thoughts. In this case, mind wandering is a result of
executive control failures. Therefore, higher WMC individuals will now show less
mind wandering. Nevertheless, the context dependent relationship does assume
that mind wandering requires working memory resources. However, most of the
support for this context dependent relationship between WMC and mind
wandering comes from separate studies looking at either demanding or nondemanding task contexts individually.
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Working Memory Load and Mind Wandering
In order to investigate the components of Baddeley's (2000) working
memory model in the production of stimulus-independent thought (SIT), Teasdale
et al. (1995, 1993) have investigated the relationship between working memory
load and mind wandering. Initial studies revealed that increasing task demands,
by increasing memory load, decreased reports of mind wandering (Teasdale et
al., 1993). To further investigate this relation, Teasdale et al. (1995) measured
the frequency of stimulus-independent thought (SIT) during tasks that require
different components of Baddeley (2000)’s working memory model. While they
found a reduced rate of SIT during tasks that require the phonological loop
subsystem and visuo-spatial sketchpad, this is likely due to the use of domaingeneral resources of working memory such as the central executive. Support for
this comes from Experiment 3 of Teasdale et al. (1995), in which they found an
increase of SIT during a task that participants had previous practice on compared
to a novel task. Additionally, in Experiment 4, the occurrence of SIT interfered
with performance on a random number generation task, a task that relies on
central executive processes. They found that not only do increased demands on
the central executive reduce the occurrence of SIT but also when SIT does
occur, it impairs performance on a concurrent task requiring the central
executive. Therefore Teasdale et al. (1995) concluded that the production of SIT
requires working memory resources and more specifically central executive
processes. This conclusion is consistent with a resource-demanding view of mind
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wandering. As the demands of executive control processes increase; the fewer
resources will be available to support the maintenance of task-unrelated
thoughts.
McVay and Kane (2010), however, explain the consistent findings of
reduced mind wandering with increased task demands from the control-failure
model. They argue that tasks requiring more working memory resources are
confounded with task set to maintain engaged with the task. As a task becomes
more demanding, increased proactive control will act to prevent task
disengagement; and therefore, interference from TUT is reduced. The results
from these studies, then, are interpreted as not a competition of working memory
resources devoted to the task and mind wandering; but rather, that greater task
demands require more proactive control to keep distracting information (such as
TUT) from interfering with task performance. While most of the evidence is
consistent with either the resource-demanding or resource-free hypothesis,
McVay and Kane (2010) point out evidence that is difficult to explain in terms of
the resource-demanding view. This evidence comes from studies that keep task
demands constant but manipulate the amount of working memory resources that
are available. For instance, if alcohol and fatigue reduce executive control
(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), then according to the resource-demanding view,
there should be fewer resources for TUT; and therefore, TUT should decrease
with fatigue or inebriation. However, according to the control-failure view,
reducing executive control should lead to more control-failures; and therefore,
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TUT should increase with fatigue or inebriation. In support of the control-failure
view, studies have found an increase of TUT with alcohol consumption and
fatigue (McVay & Kane, 2009; Sayette et al., 2009; Smallwood, Davies, et al.,
2004).
Another way to manipulate the amount of attentional resources in a task is
perceptual load. In a typical perceptual load task, participants are instructed to
search an array of letters for a target letter (e.g. either N or X) among a set of
irrelevant letters. A response-related distractor will appear outside of the search
array and can be either compatible (same response as target letter) or
incompatible (alternative response as target letter). According to the perceptual
load theory (Lavie & Tsal, 1994), if perceptual load is low (homogenous irrelevant
letters, e.g. all O’s), spare attentional resources will automatically process taskirrelevant information; therefore, there is distractor interference. Whereas when
perceptual load is high (heterogeneous irrelevant letters e.g. HKMLP), capacitylimited attentional resources are consumed for processing of the target stimulus,
and therefore, the distractor interference is not found. Forster & Lavie (2009)
were interested in whether perceptual load also minimizes distracter interference
from internal sources such as mind wandering, and investigated the amount of
task-unrelated thought (TUT) under low and high perceptual load. They found
that increasing perceptual load not only decreases processing of external
distractors but also of TUT, suggesting a central attentional resource for external
and internal information. Thus, the more attentional processes devoted to task-
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relevant information the less interference from TUT. Additionally, they found that
as TUT increased, the amount of distracter interference also increased. This
finding suggests that the experience of mind wandering interferes with resolving
response conflict in the perceptual load task.
Using the same high and low perceptual load display as Forster and Lavie
(2007), Levinson et al. (2012) found that higher WMC was associated with more
mind wandering under low perceptual load conditions but found no correlation
between WMC and mind wandering under high perceptual load conditions.
It is, however, important to point out the differences between working
memory load and perceptual load manipulations. Lavie et al. (2004) found that
perceptual load and working memory load can actually have opposite effects on
distractor interference. While increasing perceptual load is found to decrease
distractor interference, increasing working memory load leads to increased
distractor interference. The purpose of the current study is to investigate the role
of working memory load on mind wandering, during a distracter interference task.

The Simon Task
Another task that has been widely used to understand distracter
interference is the Simon task (Proctor, 2011). In the Simon task, response
interference is due to correspondence between an irrelevant stimulus location
and a response location. For instance, a response is made to a target stimulus
(i.e. Left response/red square and right response/green square) that appears on
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either the left or right side of the stimulus display. Even though the stimulus
location is irrelevant and to be ignored, response times are shorter when the
location of the stimulus is congruent with the response location (left/left) and
longer when incongruent with the response location (left/right); this difference is
referred to as a Simon compatibility effect (Hommel, 2011; Proctor, 2011;
Rubichi, Nicoletti, Iani, & Umiltà, 1997). Research on Simon effects has
addressed a wide variety of issues such as the role of attention and working
memory in generating stimulus and response codes, how task contexts influence
Simon effects and the role of automatic and cognitive processes (for a review;
Hommel, 2011; Proctor, 2011).
The Simon effect is commonly explained from dual-route models of
response selection (Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990; Kornblum & Lee,
1995). According to these models, response codes are activated by way of direct
(automatic) and indirect (controlled) routes. In the Simon task, the irrelevant
stimulus location produces a spatial stimulus code, which automatically activates
a corresponding spatial response code. Thus, there is a tendency to make a left
response to a stimulus appearing on the left side of a visual display and a right
response to a stimulus appearing on the right side of a visual display. The
relevant stimulus code (red or green square) is used to determine the correct
response via the controlled route based on task instructions (i.e. “press the left
hand key if the stimulus is a red square”). On congruent trials, the response
activated by the automatic route corresponds to the correct response; responding
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can continue along the automatic route. Whereas, on incongruent trials, the
automatic route activates a response that is incongruent with the correct
response, creating a response conflict; therefore, cognitive control is required for
correct responding on incongruent trials.
Recent challenges to the dual-route model of the Simon effect have been
made in favor of a response discrimination account. According to the response
discrimination account activation of spatial response codes are not automatic but
instead are formed in working memory (Ansorge & Wühr, 2004). However, if
spatial response codes do require working memory resources, then increasing
working memory load should reduce the Simon effect. Evidence for the response
discrimination account comes from studies showing a reduced or eliminated
Simon effect under working memory load (Wühr & Biebl, 2011; Zhao, Chen, &
West, 2010). Zhao et al. (2010) found that the Simon effect was eliminated with
verbal working memory load but not affected by spatial working memory load.
Wühr and Biebl (2011), however, found that spatial working memory load
eliminated the Simon effect whereas verbal load only reduced the Simon effect.
Even though these two studies differ on the type of working memory load that
has the greatest impact on the Simon effect, they both provide support for a
response discrimination account.
In the present experiment, the Simon task will be used as the main task.
Since the Simon task simply requires responding to the presentation of a single
target, it can be considered as a non-demanding task, and therefore will be
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conducive to mind wandering. In a more demanding context, the Simon task will
be performed with working memory load (dual task). The Simon task can be used
to determine the amount of distracter interference by an irrelevant spatial
location; therefore, measuring mind wandering on the Simon task can assess
distraction by external as well as internal goal-irrelevant information.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE CURRENT STUDY

Hypotheses
Simon Task
In the current study, the effects of working memory load on the Simon
effect will be crossed with individual differences in WMC. Previous research
(Wühr & Biebl, 2011; Zhao et al., 2010) has found that verbal working memory
load decreases or even eliminates the Simon effect. Therefore, it is expected that
there will be a Simon effect in single task conditions and a decreased or
eliminated Simon effect in dual task conditions (with working memory load). If the
Simon task is a measure of distractor interference, then individuals with high
WMC should show a smaller Simon effect in single task conditions. Furthermore,
the effect of working memory load on the Simon effect should be greater for low
WMC individuals. The main analysis on the Simon task will be on reaction times
(RTs) as a 2 (WMC: low-span vs. high-span) x 2 (Task: single vs. dual) x 2
(compatible vs. incompatible) mixed design ANOVA with task and compatibility
as within-subject variables and WMC as a between-subject variable.
Mind Wandering
The main issue addressed in this study is whether mind wandering
requires working memory resources. Studies investigating the role of working
memory resources in mind wandering either look at WMC related differences or
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the effects of working memory load, but not both in the same study. For example,
Levinson et al. (2012) did investigate WMC related differences in non-demanding
and demanding task context, specifically low and high perceptual load. However,
a perceptual load manipulation is different from a working memory load
manipulation (WML), as they can result in opposite effects on distractor
interference (Lavie et al., 2004). The purpose of the current study is to further
investigate this issue by crossing WMC related differences with a working
memory load manipulation. Specifically, high and low WMC participants will
perform the Simon task without verbal working memory load (single task) and
with verbal working memory load (dual task) while being intermittently probed
about the contents of their thought. The main analysis will compare the
proportion of TUT as a 2 (WMC: low-span vs. high-span) x 2 (Task: single vs.
dual) mixed-design ANOVA with task as a within-subject variable and WMC as a
between-subject variable.
According to the control-failure model, mind wandering is a result of
executive control failures and is sustained in a resource-free manner (McVay &
Kane, 2010). The hypotheses of the resource-free, control-failure model are as
follows. If mind wandering is a result of executive control failure and proceeds in
a resource-free manner, then individuals with high WMC will experience fewer
TUT in single and dual task conditions compared to those with low WMC,
because higher WMC is related to better control of executive attention. This
difference may be more pronounced in dual task conditions because demand to
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prevent TUT interference on task performance is greater; therefore, control of
executive attention differences should be more pronounced. Overall, there
should be less TUT in a dual task compared to a single task; again, because
demands to prevent mind wandering interference on task performance is greater
for a dual task than a single task.
An alternative view is that working memory resources are required to
sustain an internal train of thought during mind wandering (Smallwood, 2010).
The hypotheses of the resource-demanding view are as follows. If working
memory resources are required to sustain mind wandering, then individuals with
high WMC will experience more TUT compared to those with low WMC, in single
and dual task conditions. More working memory resources are required to
perform a dual task compared to a single task; therefore, there should be less
mind wandering in a dual task compared to a single task.
Mind Wandering and Task Performance
Given the findings from Wühr and Biebl (2011) and Zhao et al. (2010) on
the effects of working memory reducing the Simon effect, some predictions can
be made regarding the effect of mind wandering on the Simon effect. From the
resource-free view, mind wandering should increase the Simon effect because
control-failures result in mind wandering, on one hand, and impair resolving
response conflict in the Simon task, on the other (Weldon, Mushlin, Kim, & Sohn,
2013). From the resource-demanding view, mind wandering should have the
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same effect as working memory load by decreasing the Simon effect because it
requires working memory resources.
Furthermore, the two views of mind wandering can be dissociated by the
effects of WMC on the relation between mind wandering and task performance
(McVay & Kane, 2012). If mind wandering does not require working memory
resources, then there should be no effect of WMC on relation between mind
wandering and task performance. This is because the experience of mind
wandering is a result of control-failures, regardless of WMC. If mind wandering
does require working memory resources and low WMC individuals have fewer
working memory resource, then mind wandering should have more of an impact
on task performance for low WMC individuals compared to those with high WMC
because low WMC individuals have fewer resources to split between mind
wandering and task performance and therefore more interference.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHOD

Participants
28 female students from California State University, San Bernardino, who
completed the screening sessions of the working memory study participated in
the current experiment. The screening sessions consisted of two, one-hour
sessions in which participants completed measures of working memory and
general fluid intelligence. The working memory measures included; portions of
the Wide Range Assessment of Memory and Learning (finger windows, number
letters, verbal working memory, symbolic working memory) (Sheslow & Adams,
2003), operation-span and symmetry span tasks (Redick et al., 2012). The
general fluid intelligence measures included; Raven’s Advanced Matrices
(Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998), Inferences and Letter Sets (Ekstrom, French,
Harman, & Dermen, 1976). Based on the Operation span partial score (described
below), they were recruited from the top 25% (high WMC group) and bottom 25%
(low WMC group) of the participant pool, resulting in 15 high WMC and 13 low
WMC participants. Participants were compensated with a $10 gift card. All
participants signed the consent form approved by the IRB, and were be treated in
accordance with the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct
(American Psychological Association, 2010).
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Stimuli
Working Memory Capacity
Participants completed the automated operation span (OSPAN); a dual
task where participants need to remember presented memory items for later
recall while performing an unrelated processing task (Redick et al., 2012). For
the processing task, participants need to verify solutions to mathematical
equations (yes or no response). OSPAN memory items consisted of 12 letters.
After participants make a verification response, a random letter appears, and the
participant is to remember it for later recall. This sequence, processing task
followed by a memory letter, is repeated 3-7 times. Following this, all 12 letters
are displayed and participants need to identify the presented memory letters in
their serial order, the order in which they appeared. Each set length (3-7) was
presented three times, randomly ordered for each participant.
Scores on the OSPAN task were calculated as the sum of correct items
recalled in their serial position (partial span scores), with a maximum score of 75
(Redick et al., 2012). Participants were divided into low-span and high-span
groups based on the percentile distribution of partial OSPAN scores presented in
Redick et al. (2012). Low-span participants were selected from the bottom 25th
percentile and high-span participants from the top 75th percentile.
Simon Task
Stimulus presentation and data collection were controlled by E-Prime
(Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) on a PC-compatible computer.
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Stimuli were presented on a 17-inch monitor. In the single task condition,
participants performed the Simon task. For the stimulus display, a target stimulus
(red or green square) was presented to the left or right of a central fixation point.
Participants were instructed to press the “n” key with their right index for a green
square and the “x” key with their left index finger for a red square. They were also
instructed to ignore the location of the target stimulus, as it was irrelevant. The
target stimulus location could either be compatible or incompatible with the
response location. In a dual task condition, participants performed the same
Simon task, however with working memory load. The memory task manipulation
was a verbal working memory load of 6 digits, ranging from 1-9. For the memory
display, the memory items were displayed horizontally above the central fixation
point. In the memory probe display, a single digit (1-9) was presented.
Participants were instructed to press the “m” key, with their right middle finger, if
the single digit was among the memory items and to press the “z” key, with their
left middle finger, if the single digit was not among the memory items. Reaction
times (RT) and error rates on the Simon task and memory task were analyzed as
a 2 (WMC: low-span vs. high-span) x 2 (Task: single vs. dual) x 2 (compatible vs.
incompatible) mixed-design ANOVA with task and compatibility as within-subject
variables and WMC as a between-subject variable.
Thought Probes
When a thought probe appeared on the display, participants were asked
“what were you thinking just now?” along with the following response options, 1)
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Task-related thought 2) A memory from the past 3) Something in the future 4)
Current state of being 5) Other. Before beginning the experiment, participants
were given an explanation or example of each option. Participants were to report
what was passing through their mind by pressing the corresponding number key.
Option 1 was coded as on-task thought while options 2-5 were considered as
TUT (McVay et al., 2013). Proportion of responses to thought probes were
analyzed as a 2 (WMC: low-span vs. high-span) x 2 (Task: single vs. dual) x 2
(Thought type: on-task vs. TUT) mixed-design ANOVA with task and thought
type as within-subject variables and WMC as a between-subject variable.
Proportion of past and future-oriented mind wandering were also compared as a
2 (WMC: low-span vs. high-span) x 2 (Task: single vs. dual) x 2 (Thought
orientation: past vs. future) mixed-design ANOVA with task and compatibility as
within-subject variables and WMC as a between-subject variable.

Procedure
The experiment took place in a dimly lit room. The following description of
the experimental procedure is depicted in Figure 1. In the single task condition, a
central fixation point was presented for 1000 msec followed by a mask (######)
for 3000 msec. Another fixation display was presented for 500 msec followed by
a stimulus display for 2000 msec or until participants made a response to the
target stimulus by pressing their right index finger for a green circle and left index
finger for a red circle, ignoring target location. After the stimulus display, a central
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fixation point was presented for another 500 msec followed by a mask (#) for
1000 msec. In the dual task condition, a central fixation point was presented for
1000 msec. Then the memory display, containing six memory items, was
presented for 1500 msec followed by a mask (######) for 1500 msec. Next
another fixation point was displayed for 500 msec followed by the stimulus
display for 2000 msec or until participants made a response. Another fixation
point was displayed for 500 msec followed by the memory probe display for 2000
msec or until a response was made. Note that the trial durations were the same
for single and dual tasks, the only difference being that in the single task the
memory items were replaced with a #. Practice blocks consisted of 3 blocks for
the single task, 2 blocks for memory task only, and 3 blocks dual task with 8 trials
in each block followed by a thought probe. In the experimental session, the single
and dual tasks were counterbalanced in an ABBA fashion for a total of 20 blocks
of 20 trials. Thought probes were presented at the end of each block.
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Figure 1. Trial Sequence For Dual Task and Single Task Conditions.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS

Demographics
Demographic information for the WMC groups were compared and no
differences were found on Age (High WMC: M = 24.4, SD = 6.08, Low WMC: M
= 22.5, SD = 2.9), class standing (High WMC: M = 3.4, SD = 0.91, Low WMC: M
= 3.1, SD = 0.75), number of credits earned (High WMC: M = 123.2, SD = 58.00,
Low WMC: M = 117.9, SD = 49.28) and GPA (High WMC: M = 3.2, SD = 0.54,
Low WMC: M = 3.0, SD = 0.40). Mean OSPAN partial scores were significantly
difference between the high WMC group 68.5 (SD = 2.48) and the low WMC
group 39.9 (SD = 7.98), t(26) = 13.25, p < .001.

Simon Task
For all analyses on RTs, incorrect responses were excluded. The same
exclusion criteria was used as Zhao et al. (2010); for single task conditions, RTs
shorter than 150ms and longer than 1500ms were excluded from analyses and
for dual task conditions, RTs shorter than 250ms and longer than 2500ms were
excluded. Mean RTs and error rates on the Simon task are shown in Table 1,
and were analyzed separately as 2 (WMC) × 2 (Task) × 2 (Compatibility) mixeddesign ANOVAs.
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Table 1.
Mean Reaction Times and Error Rates on the Simon Task with Working Memory
Load Conditions for Low and High Working Memory Capacity Participants

High WMC

Low WMC
No WML
RT

%
Errors

M

569

SD

WML
RT

%
Errors

1.3

679

125.6

1.25

M

619

SD

121.6

Compatibilty

No WML

WML

RT

%
Errors

RT

%
Errors

2.3

486

0.3

608

1.0

141.5

2.39

94.2

0.46

125.0

1.07

2.8

695

4.9

523

1.6

608

2.0

3.11

146.7

4.80

84.8

2.29

124.9

2.07

Compatible

Incompatible

I-C

50.2

16.3

37.3

0.0

Reaction Times
For RTs, There was a main effect of Task, in which RTs were shorter for
single task conditions than dual task conditions, F(1, 26) = 73.03, p < .001, partial
η2 = .737. There was a main effect of compatibility, RTs were longer for
incompatible than for compatible conditions, F(1, 26) = 54.08, p < .001, partial η2
= .675; thus, there was a Simon compatibility effect. There was no main effect of
WMC, although it was marginally significant with high WMC participants showing
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shorter RTs overall, F(1, 26) = 3.66, p = .067, partial η2 = .123. A WMC ×
Compatibility interaction was significant, F(1, 26) = 4.26, p = .049, partial η2 =
.141, in which there was a larger Simon effect for low WMC compared to high
WMC participants, see Figure 2. A Task × Compatibility interaction was
significant, F(1, 26) = 18.18, p < .001, partial η2 = .412, see Figure 3. There was
no Simon effect for the dual task condition, t(27) = 1.63, p=.114, whereas the
Simon effect was significant for the single task condition, t(27) = 688, p <
.001.There was neither a WMC × Task interaction, F(1, 26) = 0.19, p = .667, nor
a WMC × Task × Compatibility three-way interaction, F(1, 26) = .04, p = .841.
The lack of a thee-way interaction was due to a similar reduction in the Simon
compatibility effect from single to dual task conditions, for both high WMC (Mean
dual task reduction = 37.3 msec) and low WMC participants (Mean dual task
reduction = 33.9). However, even though reductions in the Simon effect were
similar between WMC groups, the Simon effect in dual task conditions was
eliminated for the high WMC participants (M = 0.03, SD = 22.37), t(14) = .01, p =
.995, and only reduced yet still significant for the low WMC participants (M =
16.31, SD = 24.98), t(12) = 2.35, p = .036.
Error Rates
For error rates, there was a main effect of WMC, F(1, 26) = 6.81, p = .015,
partial η2 = .208; high WMC participants made fewer errors compared to low
WMC participants. There was a main effect of Task, F(1, 26) = 9.36, p = .005,
partial η2 = .265. More errors were made in dual task conditions compared to
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Figure 2. Mean Reaction Times on Compatible and Incompatible Trials for
Working Memory Capacity Groups, Collapsed Across Task C
Conditions
onditions.
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Figure 3. Mean Reaction Times on Compatible and Incompatible Trials for
Working Memory Load Conditions, Collapsed Across Working Memory Capacity
Groups

single task conditions. There was also a main effect of compatibility, F(1, 26) =
10.02, p = .004, partial η2 = .278, in which more errors were made on
incompatible compared to compatible trials; thus, there was a Simon effect in
error rates as well. However, there were no significant interactions anywhere; in
other words, there was no effect of WMC or Task on the magnitude of the Simon
effect when looking at error rates.
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Memory Task
RTs and error rates on the memory task are shown in Table 2, and were
analyzed separately as 2 (WMC) × 2 (Compatibility) mixed design ANOVAs. For
RTs, there was no main effects of WMC, F(1, 26) = 1.82, p = .188, or
compatibility, F(1, 26) = .251, p = .621, and no interaction, F(1, 26) = .001, p =
.997. For error rates, there was a main effect of WMC, F(1, 26) = 10.00, p = .004,
partial η2 = .278, error rates were lower for high WMC participants compared to
low WMC participants. There was a main effect of compatibility, F(1, 26) = 13.13,
p = .001, partial η2 = .336, but no interaction, F(1, 26) = 0.24, p = .627. Error
rates on the memory task were higher if the Simon trial was incompatible
compared to if it was compatible.
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Table 2.
Mean Reaction Times and Error Rates on the Memory Task for Low and High
Working Memory Capacity Participants

Low WMC
Compatibility

High WMC

RT

% Errors

RT

% Errors

908

17.8

797

7.8

257.2

10.36

173.7

6.30

904

21.0

794

10.2

262.2

11.68

175.5

6.89

906

19.4

795

9.0

Compatible
M
SD
Incompatible
M
SD
Average

Thought Probes
The five response options to thought probes were 1) Task-related thought,
2) A memory from the past, 3) Something in the future, 4) Current state of being
and 5) Other. Response option 1 was considered as on-task while response
options 2-5 were considered as TUT. The percentage of TUT was calculated as
the number of responses made for options 2-5 divided by 10, the total number of
thought probes.
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Percentage of response options are presented in Table 3 and were
analyzed as a 2 (WMC) × 2 (Task) × 6 (Thought type) mixed design ANOVA. The
main effect of Task, F(1, 26) = 34.08, p < .001, partial η2 = .567, was due to
TUTs and is analyzed separately below. There was a main effect of Thought
type, F(1, 26) = 33.32, p < .001, partial η2 = .562 in which there were differences
in the amount of thought types reported. The effect of task was different for the
six Thought types as indicated by the Task × Thought type interaction, F(1, 26) =
24.49, p < .001, partial η2 = .485, and this interaction will also be analyzed
separately below, for the Thought types of interest. No other effects or interaction
were significant, F(1,26) < .01, p < .05.

43

Table 3.
Mean Percentage of Task-Unrelated Thought Response Options Comparing
WMC in Single and Dual Tasks
WMC

On-Task

TUT

Past

Future

Current

Other

Single
M

30.8

69.2

4.6

22.3

33.1

9.2

(SD)

(26.0)

(26.0)

(7.8)

(14.8)

(21.4)

(12.6)

M

32.7

67.3

11.3

16.7

34.0

5.33

(SD)

(24.3)

(24.3)

(13.6)

(16.8)

(23.2)

(8.3)

Low

High

Dual

M

59.2

40.8

5.4

12.3

20.8

2.3

(SD)

(35.7)

(35.7)

(11.3)

(18.3)

(18.9)

(4.4)

M

72.3

28.7

8.0

4.7

14.0

2.0

(SD)

(30.9)

(30.9)

(13.7)

(7.4)

(19.9)

(5.6)

Low

High

Task-unrelated Thought
The percentage of TUTs are shown in Figure 4 and were analyzed as a 2
(WMC) × 2 (Task) mixed design ANOVA. There was a main effect of Task, F(1,
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26) = 34.08, p < .001, partial η2 = .567. The percentage of TUT was reduced in
the dual task conditions (M = 34.3%) compared to the single task conditions (M =
68.2%). There was no main effect of WMC, F(1, 26) = 0.54, p = .470, and no
WMC × Task interaction, F(1, 26) = 0.79, p = .383.

TUT
100
90
80

% TUT

70
60

Low WMC

50
40

High WMC

30
20
10
0
Single

Dual

Figure 4. Percentage of Task-Unrelated Thought for Low and High Working
Memory Capacity Participants in Single and Dual Task Conditions

Past, Future and Current State of Being
Percentage of TUT type were analyzed as a 2 (WMC) × 2 (Task) × 5 (TUT
type) mixed design ANOVA. There was a main effect of Task, F(1, 26) = 34.08, p
< .001, partial η2 = .567, which was already reported above. There was a main
effect of TUT type, F(1, 26) = 56.46, p < .001, partial η2 = .685, in which there
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were differences in the TUT type reported. The effect of Task was different for
the TUT type as indicated by the Task × TUT type interaction, F(1, 26) = 13.49, p
< .001, partial η2 = .342 and is analyzed separately for past, future and current
state of being TUT below.
Proportions of past, future and current state of being TUT were calculated
in two-ways in which they have been done so in previous research. First, past
and future TUT were calculated as the percentage of overall thought reports, as
done in Smallwood et al. (2009). This measure reflects participants overall
propensity to engage in past or future oriented thought while performing the task.
Percentage of past, future and current state of being TUT are presented in Table
3 and were analyzed as 2 (WMC) × 2 (Task) mixed design ANOVAs.
Thought Type / Overall Thought Report
There were no main effects of WMC, F(1, 26) = 1.53, p = .227, or Task,
F(1, 26) = 0.26, p = .616, and no WMC × Task interaction, F(1, 26) = 0.66, p =
.424, on percentage of Past/Total. For Future/Total, there was a main effect of
Task, F(1, 26) = 9.91, p = .004, partial η2 = .276, in which Future/Total were
reduced for the dual task compared to the single task, see Figure 5. There was
no main effect of WMC and no WMC × Task interaction, F(1, 26) = 0.08, p =
.777, for percentage of Future/Total. For current state of being, there was no
main effect of WMC, F(1, 26) = 0.19, p = .665. There was a main effect of Task,
F(1, 26) = 14.07, p = .001, partial η2 = .351, in which thoughts about current state
of being were reduced for the dual task compared to the single task. There was
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no main effect of WMC, F(1, 26) = 0.19, p = .665 and no WMC × Task
interaction, F(1,
(1, 26) = 0.80, p = .380, for percentage of current state of
being/Total.

Future/Total
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% of Future TUT
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Low WMC

40

High WMC

30
20
10
0
Single

Dual

Figure 5. Percentage of Future
Future-oriented Thought Out of Total Number of Thought
Reports for Low and High Working Memory Capacity P
Participants
articipants in Single and
Dual Task Conditions

unrelated Thought
Thought Type / Task-unrelated
Past, future and current state of being TUT were also calculated as a
percentage of overall TUT, as do
done in Baird et al. (2011).. This reflects
participants relative tendency to engage in past or future thought on the
occasions in which they were mind wandering. Three high WMC participants
par
and
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one low WMC participant did not report any TUTs on dual task conditions and
therefore proportion of past and future TUT could not be calculated. This resulted
in 24 participants (high WMC: n = 12, low WMC: n = 12) in which percentage of
past, future and current state of being TUT were analyzed as a 2 (WMC) × 2
(Task) mixed design ANOVA.
There was a main effect of WMC on percentage of past TUT, F(1, 22) =
4.76, p = .040, partial η2 = .178, see Figure 6. High WMC participants showed
more past TUTs (M = 21.1%) compared to low WMC participants (M = 5.8%).
There was no main effect of Task on percentage of past TUT, F(1, 22) = 1.90, p
= .182, and no WMC × Task interaction for past TUT, F(1, 22) = 1.60, p = .220.
For percentage of future TUT, there were no main effects of Task, F(1, 22) =
0.74, p = .399, or WMC, F(1, 22) = 1.83, p = .190, and no WMC × Task
interaction, F(1, 22) = 0.99, p = .330. For percentage of current state of
being/TUT, there were no main effects of WMC, F(1, 22) = 0.02, p = .895, or
Task, F(1, 22) = 0.04, p = .837, and no WMC × Task interaction, F(1, 22) = 0.26,
p = .614.
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Figure 6. Percentage of Past
Past-oriented
oriented Thought Out of Overall Task-Unrelated
Task
Thoughts for Low and High Working Memory Capacity Participants in Single and
Dual Task Conditions

Correlations
Correlations between TUTs and task performance measures were
conducted in order to investigate the relationship between mind wandering and
task performance. Task performance measures on the single and dual tasks
included; RTs, error rates, Simon effects an
and
d error rates on the memory task for
dual task conditions. Correlation tables for high and low WMC groups can be
seen in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. Furthermore, separate correlations were
done for high and low WMC groups in order to detect any differences
differenc due to
working memory capacity. For high WMC participants, TUTs did not correlate
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with performance in either the single or dual tasks. However, for low WMC
participants TUTs did correlate with compatibility effects, r (11) = -.559, p = .047,
and error rates, r (11) = .611, p = .026, in the single task conditions. As TUTs
increased, compatibility effects decreased and error rates increased.
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Table 4.
Correlations amongst Task-Unrelated Thoughts and Performance Measures for
High Working Memory Capacity Participants
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

1.

Single Task
TUT

2.

Dual Task
TUT

.59*

-

3.

Single Task
RTs

-0.35

-0.04

-

4.

Dual Task
RTs

-.56*

-0.31

.89**

-

5.

Single Task
Simon Effect

-0.28

-.66**

-0.39

-0.12

-

6.

Dual Task
Simon Effect

-0.22

-0.07

0.13

-0.01

-0.30

-

7.

Single Task
Errors

0.14

-0.17

0.29

0.36

-0.07

-0.44

-

8.

Dual Task
Errors

-0.13

-0.05

-0.17

-0.14

-0.03

0.20

0.19

-

9.

Memory
Errors

-0.06

-0.33

-0.36

-0.37

0.36

-0.16

-0.16

0.18

9.

-

-

Note. N = 15. Simon effect was calculated by taking RTs in incompatible
conditions minus compatible conditions. RTs, and errors were collapsed across
compatibility conditions.
* p < .05, ** p < .001
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Table 5.
Correlations amongst Task-Unrelated Thoughts and Performance Measures for
Low Working Memory Capacity Participants
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

1.

Single Task
TUT

2.

Dual Task
TUT

0.39

-

3.

Single Task
RTs

0.25

0.04

-

4.

Dual Task
RTs

-0.00

0.06

.91**

5.

Single Task
Simon Effect

-.56*

-0.19 -0.10

0.26

-

6.

Dual Task
Simon Effect

0.38

-0.17

0.36

0.21

-0.11

-

7.

Single Task
Errors

.61*

0.00

0.38

0.25

-0.17

0.23

-

8.

Dual Task
Errors

0.34

-0.13

0.46

0.23

-0.45

0.14

.71**

-

9.

Memory
Errors

0.30

0.14

-0.37 -0.42 -0.00 -0.23

0.37

0.14

9.

-

-

-

Note. N = 13. Simon effect was calculated by taking RTs in incompatible
conditions minus compatible conditions. RTs, and errors were collapsed across
compatibility conditions.
* p < .05, ** p < .001

52

CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION

Summary of Results
In summary, the Simon effect was reduced in dual task conditions and to a
similar degree between high and low WMC groups. However, high WMC
participants showed an elimination of the Simon effect in dual task conditions;
whereas, the low WMC group only showed a reduction of the Simon effect.
Overall, high WMC participants had a smaller Simon effect compared to those
with low WMC.
In regards to mind wandering, TUTs were less frequent in dual task
compared to single task conditions and this was specifically for future and current
state of being TUTs. There was no effect of WMC on overall amount of TUTs and
no WMC x task interaction. High WMC participants did show more past TUTs,
though only when calculated out overall amount of TUTs. For the correlations of
mind wandering with task performance, TUTs did correlate with Simon effects
and error rates in single task conditions but only for the low WMC group. TUTs
negatively correlated with Simon effects and positively correlated with error rates.

The Role of Working Memory in the Simon Task
The response discrimination account of the Simon effect claims that
interference between irrelevant spatial codes and relevant response codes arises
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in working memory (Ansorge & Wühr, 2004). According to this account, it was
expected that the Simon effect would be reduced or even eliminated for the dual
task conditions compared to the single task conditions. The results supported the
response discrimination account and are consistent with previous studies by
Wühr and Biebl (2011) and Zhao, Chen, and West (2010), where they found
either a reduction or even elimination of the Simon effect by a verbal working
memory load. Furthermore, but less confidently, it was expected that the low
WMC participants would show a greater reduction in the Simon effect compared
to high WMC participants. However, the reduction of the Simon effect was the
same between WMC groups. Although the reduction was of the same magnitude,
the Simon effect was eliminated for high WMC but not low WMC participants.
Why the Simon effect was eliminated for the high WMC participants but
only reduced for low WMC participants is not clear. Although it could be due to
the fact that the magnitude of the Simon effect for the high WMC was lower in the
first place, the absence of a Simon effect vs. the presence of a Simon effect is an
important distinction. One possibility is that the two groups used different
representations for spatial response codes in working memory. Wühr and Biebl
(2011) found differential effects of verbal and spatial working memory on
horizontal and vertical Simon effects. Their interpretation is that the horizontal
Simon task is represented by visual-spatial codes whereas the vertical Simon
task is represented by verbal codes. However, it is not clear why the two groups
would use different response code representations without any instruction to do
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so. Another explanation could be due to differential overlap of verbal working
memory load with irrelevant location information and relevant stimulus-response
location. Wühr and Biebl (2011) explain their results from a specialized load
account (Park, Kim, & Chun, 2007). They assume that overlap between working
memory load and irrelevant location information had a greater effect than overlap
between working memory load and relevant stimulus-response location, in the
Simon task. Overlap of the former would result in a decrease of the Simon effect
and overlap of the latter would result in an increase of the Simon effect. It could
be that, high WMC participants are better at minimizing the overlap of working
memory load and relevant stimulus-response location; and therefore, high WMC
participants showed no Simon distracter interference and low WMC participants
showed only a reduced Simon effect. Further investigations would be needed to
confirm this interpretation, however findings from Weldon et al. (2013) suggest
that those with higher WMC more optimally adjust the level of cognitive control to
resolve response conflicts on the Simon task.

The Relation Between Working Memory and Mind Wandering
The current study investigated competing hypotheses concerning the
relation between working memory resources and mind wandering. The resourcedemanding hypothesis states that mind wandering consumes working memory
resources; whereas, the resource-free hypothesis states that mind wandering
occurs without the need of working memory resources and is a result of control
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failures. Under the resource-demanding hypothesis, it was expected that mind
wandering would decrease in dual task conditions compared to single task
conditions and high WMC participants would mind wander more than low WMC
participants. The resource-free hypothesis expected the same relation between
Task and mind wandering, but expected that high WMC participants would mind
wander less than low WMC participants, especially in dual task conditions. While
previous studies on mind wandering have not combined working memory load
manipulations with working memory capacity measures, the current study did so.
As expected under both hypotheses, it was found that dual task conditions
reduced mind wandering. However, no differences were found between high and
low WMC participants on the overall amount of mind wandering, which was not
expected by either hypothesis.
Even though there was no effect of WMC on mind wandering, previous
research has actually found inconsistent findings on this relationship. In nondemanding task contexts, Levinson et al. (2012) found that higher WMC is
associated with more mind wandering while other studies have found no
correlation at all (Baird et al., 2011; McVay & Kane, 2012). Therefore, the
findings reported here that WMC does not affect mind wandering, at least in
single task conditions, is consistent with some previous research. It may be that
under non-demanding task contexts WMC is just not associated with mind
wandering and that it requires a more demanding task for there to be an
association (McVay & Kane, 2010).
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More challenging to explain is the result that WMC does not affect mind
wandering in dual task conditions. In fact, a consistent finding in the literature is
that higher WMC is associated with less mind wandering under demanding task
contexts (McVay, Kane, & Kwapil, 2009; McVay et al., 2013; McVay & Kane,
2009, 2012; Unsworth & McMillan, 2012). One possibility may be due to the
differences in the demanding task used in the current study and previous studies.
Most studies showing WMC related differences in mind wandering have used the
SART as the demanding task while a dual-task paradigm was used here. While
they both can be considered as demanding they share very little similarities. On
the SART task, goal maintenance is required to prevent pre-potent or habitual
responding on no-go trials; whereas, dual-task interference and resolving
response conflict is the challenge on the Simon task with working memory load. It
could be argued that maintaining task goals on the SART task is more directly
related to mind wandering, because of control failures, than minimizing dual-task
interference on the Simon task is related to mind wandering. In fact, McVay and
Kane (2012) found an effect of WMC on mind wandering in only a standard
SART but not a vigilance SART. In the standard SART, no-go trials are
infrequent, whereas in the vigilance SART no-go trials are frequent and go-trials
are infrequent. An explanation they provide for their findings is the lack of a goal
maintenance component to the vigilance SART. Therefore, the differences in
findings from the current study to previous studies may have to do with the
differences in the type of demands on the two tasks. Perhaps working memory
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capacity only predicts propensity for mind wandering in tasks that place high
demands on active goal maintenance, or proactive executive control. This would
be an interesting area for further investigation.
The effect of task demands on reducing mind wandering is a robust
finding in the literature on mind wandering and was predicted by both the
resource-demanding and resource-free views of mind wandering. Where the two
hypotheses differed was in their prediction on the relationship between WMC and
mind wandering; however, there were no WMC related differences found in this
study. Keeping in mind that although there are no significant differences, there
are trends in the data that suggest an effect of WMC. While high and low WMC
participants showed nearly the same amount of mind wandering in single task
conditions (M = 67.2% and M = 69.3%, respectively), high WMC participants
tended to show less mind wandering (M = 28.7%) in dual conditions compared to
low WMC participants (M = 40.8%). This trend for high WMC participants to show
less mind wandering in the dual task conditions lends more support to a controlfailure model of mind wandering.
Although the current results are not able to reconcile whether working
memory resources are required for maintaining mind wandering, the findings on
future-oriented TUT indicate a role of working memory resources. Smallwood,
Nind, and O’Connor (2009) have argued that future-oriented mind wandering
requires more working memory resources than past-oriented. Future-oriented
mind wandering was found to have decreased in dual task compared to single
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task conditions; whereas, there was no effect of task on past-oriented mind
wandering, consistent with results from Smallwood, Nind, and O’Connor (2009).
This finding suggests that at least future-oriented mind wandering requires
working memory resources. However, there were no working memory capacity
related differences on future-oriented mind wandering. Instead, high WMC
participants showed more past-oriented mind wandering than low WMC
participants but only when past TUT was calculated out of the overall amount of
TUT.
In addition to the findings on future-oriented TUT, there is some indication
that mind wandering consumes working memory resources similar to that of
working memory load. Consistent with a response discrimination account of the
Simon effect (Ansorge & Wühr, 2004), working memory load reduced the Simon
effect. Interestingly, in the single task conditions mind wandering acted similarly
to a working memory load as evident by the large negative correlation between
TUTs and the Simon effect, r(26) = -.423, p = .025. Just as working memory load
reduces the Simon effect, as the amount of TUTs increased the Simon effect
decreased. Furthermore, this correlation was actually only significant for the low
WMC group, r(11) = -.559, p = .047, but not the high WMC group, r(13) = -.283.
This WMC related difference of mind wandering on task performance lends more
support to the resource-demanding view because high WMC individuals should
have more resources to distribute between mind wandering and performing the
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task. Whereas from the resource-free view, because mind wandering is a result
of control-failures it should affect performance regardless of WMC.
While the trend in the data of WMC on mind wandering supports a
resource-free view and control-failure model, the findings on future-oriented TUT
and mind wandering on task performance lend more support to the resource
demanding view. A possible explanation for these disparate findings is from a
context dependent relationship between WMC and mind wandering, which does
assume that mind wandering requires working memory resources (Smallwood,
2010). From this perspective, higher WMC leads to more mind wandering in nondemanding contexts but less mind wandering in demanding task contexts. In the
current study, there was a trend towards an interaction in which higher WMC
lead to less mind wandering in dual tasks but no effect of WMC in single tasks. In
fact, the trend in the results are somewhat consistent with the results of a recent
study (Rummel & Boywitt, 2014) on mind wandering that also combined
manipulations of task difficulty with WMC measures.
Rummel and Boywitt (2014) used an n-back task to manipulate task
demands, 1-n back for low task demands and 3-n back for high task demands.
They found that WMC had a marginal, p < .07, negative correlation with TUT in
low task demands and a positive correlation with TUT in high task demands.
Higher WMC was associated with more mind wandering in low task demands
and less mind wandering in high task demands. Within a single experiment,
Rummel and Boywitt (2014) may be the first study to show support for the
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context dependent relationship between WMC and mind wandering, suggested
by Smallwood (2010).
In the current study, the lack of WMC related differences in mind
wandering was not expected and may possibly be due to some limitations. One
possible limitation why no WMC related differences in mind wandering were
found may be due to splitting participants into low and high WMC groups.
Previous studies that have found WMC related differences in mind wandering
used WMC as a continuous variable (Baird et al., 2011; Levinson et al., 2012;
McVay et al., 2009, 2013; McVay & Kane, 2009, 2012). Additionally, the only
measure of WMC used in the current study was the OSPAN and the use of
multiple measures may provide a more accurate measure of an individuals WMC
(Redick et al., 2012).

Conclusion
The role of working memory in mind wandering is not well understood and
there are two hypotheses concerning this relationship, the resource-demanding
and resource-free views. The purpose of the current study was to investigate the
relationship between working memory capacity and mind wandering under
demanding and non-demanding contexts. The results of the current study do not
provide strong support for one hypothesis over the other. Although WMC related
differences in mind wandering were non-significant, there was a trend towards a
context dependent interaction between WMC and mind wandering and some
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evidence for a role of working memory resources in mind wandering. Perhaps a
context-dependent explanation of the relationship between working memory
capacity and mind wandering offers the most complete explanation of the results
in the current study as well as previous research. The different demands a task
places on proactive executive control and response conflict may further clarify
the role of working memory on mind wandering. The exact role working memory
plays in the experience of mind wandering will continue to be investigated in
future research.
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The Role of Working Memory Resources in Mind Wandering: Informed Consent
You are invited to participate in a study being conducted as a Master’s Thesis by graduate student Jason
Tsukahara of the Psychology Department of California State University, San Bernardino (CSUSB), under
the supervision of Dr. Hideya Koshino. This study is approved by the Psychology Department
subcommittee of the Institutional Review Board of California State University, San Bernardino, and a copy
of the official Psychology IRB stamp of approval should appear on this consent form. The University
requires that you give your consent before participating in this study.
This study examines an interaction between working memory capacity and working memory load on mind
wandering during an attention task. The experiment consists of single task and dual task sessions. The
single task session includes an attention task, in which you will see a central fixation point followed by a
stimulus display. In the dual task, you are asked to remember some memory items while you perform the
attention task. Please respond as quickly and accurately as possible in the attention task. After the attention
task, you will be asked to perform the memory test. At the end of each block you will be asked "what were
you thinking just now?" and will be presented with several different response options. The entire session
will take approximately one hour to complete.
The experiments involves no risks beyond those of daily life, and no direct benefits to the individual other
than an introduction to psychological research and $10 compensation for participating. However, your data
may help to increase our understanding of working memory and mind wandering. The investigator will not
associate your name in any way with the research findings, and all data are anonymous. Your participation
in this study is completely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time without negative
consequences. You may receive $10 for your participation. Please feel free to ask any questions that you
have. Should questions concerning the study arise at a later date, please do not hesitate to contact the
principal investigator at the phone number or address below, or in the event of a research-related injury,
please contact the University’s Institutional Review Board at (909) 537-5027. Results of this study will be
available from Jason Tsukahara after the Spring quarter of 2014 upon request.
Please read the following before indicating that you are willing to participate.
1. The study has been explained to me and I understand the explanation that has been given and what my
participation will involve.
2. I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary, and that I may withdraw from participation at
any time, or refuse to answer any specific question, without penalty or withdrawal of benefit to which I am
otherwise entitled.
3. I understand that if I have any questions or concerns regarding this study, or if I wish to receive
additional explanations after my participation is completed, I can contact Jason Tsukahara at (425) 7708506 or tsukj304@coyote.csusb.edu.
I acknowledge that I have been informed of, and understand the true nature and purpose of this study, and I
freely consent to participate. I acknowledge that I am at least 18 years of age. Please indicate your desire to
participate by placing and “X” on the line below.
Participant’s X _______
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Date: ___________
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